C.H. Robinson is a leading asset-light third‑party logistics provider with unmatched scale across 83,000 customers, 450,000 contract carriers and ~37 million annual shipments, unified on its Navisphere platform.
Management has executed an aggressive lean transformation and embedded AI into quote‑to‑cash workflows, lowering cost to serve and expanding operating leverage even through a soft freight market.
Recent divestiture of the European Surface Transportation unit sharpened focus on core North American truckload/LTL and global ocean/air forwarding, and the board added a new $2 billion repurchase authorization. Financially, the model remains cash generative with minimal capex.
Using SEC filings, we calculate TTM free cash flow at roughly $807 million based on operating cash flow of about $877 million and capex near $70 million through Q3 2025. Diluted share count averaged ~121.4 million YTD, implying ~$6.65 FCF per share.
The balance sheet carries investment‑grade characteristics with total debt around $1.18 billion, ~$137 million cash, an undrawn $1.0 billion revolver, and a receivables securitization facility for working capital flexibility. Dividends have been raised annually for 25+ years and the quarterly dividend was lifted to $0.63 in November 2025.
We assess a moderate, multi‑factor moat anchored in scale, data and process excellence rather than regulatory or IP barriers. Network effects: moderate strength (65/100). Liquidity on both sides of the marketplace improves matching and service breadth as the network scales (83k customers, 450k contract carriers, ~37 million shipments).
Still, shippers multi‑source and carriers access many load boards, limiting winner‑take‑all dynamics. Switching costs: modest (50/100). Many large customers embed CHRW via Navisphere and growing direct TMS/ERP integrations, which reduce friction to switch but do not fully lock‑in. Cost advantage: solid and rising (70/100).
Scale procurement, dense carrier relationships, and Lean/AI automation reduce cost to serve and expand operating leverage versus smaller brokers; management cites sustained productivity gains and mid‑cycle operating margin targets of 40% (NAST) and 30% (Global Forwarding).
Intangibles/brand: above average (60/100) given century‑long relationships, cross‑border customs capability, and a leading Laredo/Mexico footprint. Efficient scale: limited (40/100); brokerage remains fragmented and competitive across lanes.
Weighted, these yield a composite moat score of ~61. Moat durability could erode if new digital platforms re‑commoditize matching or if asset‑based carriers deepen direct shipper relationships; the 2023 failure of Convoy underscores how scale and cash generation still matter in brokerage.
End‑market pricing remains principally market‑clearing with low take‑rate tolerance. CHRW’s advantage comes from mix, discipline, and lower cost to serve, not from raising shipper prices. Recent quarters show operating margin expansion despite lower revenue, reflecting better revenue management and productivity, not price‑led power.
Mid‑cycle adjusted operating margin targets (40% NAST, 30% Global Forwarding) are achievable via operating leverage and mix, yet these are margins on gross profit, not revenue, and will ebb with cycles.
We score pricing power as moderate due to limited ability to push take‑rates across cycles; latent upside exists in specialized services (customs, cross‑border, LTL) and AI‑assisted pricing, but competitive responses and shipper multi‑sourcing constrain durability.
Revenue and earnings remain cyclical with freight capacity/demand, fuel, and global trade volatility. CHRW mitigates this with mode diversification (truckload, LTL, ocean, air) and long‑tenured customer relationships, but brokerage margins compress in loose markets and rebound in tight markets.
Management’s raised 2026 operating income target signals confidence in structural cost improvements, yet external factors such as tariffs and ocean rate swings can still drive quarterly variability.
The Q3 2025 release highlights volume outperformance and lower opex amid a soft market, illustrating improved operating leverage but not eliminating cyclicality.
Asset‑light model generates robust cash flow with minimal capex. For the TTM ending Q3 2025, we estimate FCF ≈ $807 million: operating cash flow of ~$877 million (Q4 2024 CFO ~$268 million plus 9M 2025 CFO $609 million) less capex of ~$70 million (Q4 2024 capex ~$15 million; 9M 2025 capex ~$55 million).
Liquidity is strong: cash ~$137 million, undrawn $1.0 billion revolver, receivables securitization facility capacity $500 million, and total debt ~$1.18 billion, implying manageable net leverage and investment‑grade credit metrics.
The dividend has increased for 25+ years and was lifted to $0.63 per quarter in November 2025. Overall, CHRW should comfortably fund operations, dividends, and buybacks through downturns, with working‑capital facilities buffering freight cycles.
Recent actions indicate improved discipline and focus: divested European Surface Transportation (closing Feb 1, 2025), concentrated on core modes, and resumed repurchases with a new $2.0 billion authorization approved Oct 28, 2025. Capex remains lean (~$75–85 million guided), with priority on software and automation tied to operating leverage.
The dividend policy balances return of capital with flexibility; buybacks should be opportunistic given cyclicality. M&A posture is selective, with culture fit and returns emphasized in filings. Stock‑based comp is present but not egregious for a services/tech‑enabled firm; share count edged down in 2025 as buybacks resumed.
CEO Dave Bozeman (appointed June 2023) and CFO Damon Lee (joined July 2024) are executing a lean operating model and AI roadmap that have driven sustained productivity and margin gains despite a soft market, and they raised the 2026 operating income target.
Cultural emphasis on continuous improvement and technology is clear in communications and results. Execution risk remains as AI programs scale from NAST into Global Forwarding, but early progress is evident.

C.H. Robinson est-elle un bon investissement à $173 ?
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