Skip to content

Boeing Co

NYSE: BA · USD

Boeing Co (BA) Economic Moat Analysis50

Competitive advantages, dated evidence and erosion risks.

Narrow economic moat

Boeing retains a narrow moat through its established commercial-aircraft position, accumulated engineering capabilities, regulatory barriers and aircraft lifecycle support relationships. Firm-order growth and higher deliveries demonstrate continuing demand despite execution failures. These advantages provide limited pricing protection: indexed fixed-price contracts constrain repricing, development contracts have generated losses, and commercial-aircraft operations remain loss-making. Recovery is demonstrated, but durable execution and broad pricing power are not.

Intangible assets

Established engineering capabilities and regulatory qualifications support Boeing's position as one of two major manufacturers of aircraft with more than 100 seats. Firm orders and delivered aircraft substantiate an operating franchise beyond management's leadership assertions.

Durability
Existing production programs, accumulated engineering knowledge and demanding certification processes support persistence over multiple years. Certification also constrains Boeing itself; neither guaranteed durability nor a company-wide defense moat is established.
Competitors
Comparison not established
Erosion risks
Certification delays, engine durability problems, production failures and loss-making contracts impede commercialization and value capture. Market concentration alone does not demonstrate a cost advantage or unrestricted pricing power.
What would invalidate the thesis
The thesis would fail if sustained certification or production failures prevented competitive deliveries and caused persistent firm-order contraction, or if additional manufacturers materially displaced Boeing's established commercial-aircraft position.
Evidence (6) · Counterevidence (5)

Switching costs

Training, engineering support and technical documentation supplied throughout an aircraft's operational life create continuing customer relationships and support moderate switching friction. Services backlog growth provides operating evidence of continuing demand, although exclusive dependence on Boeing is not demonstrated.

Durability
Support relationships extend across aircraft operating lives. Their economic strength depends on Boeing retaining service work rather than customers selecting alternative providers.
Competitors
Comparison not established
Erosion risks
Services markets remain highly competitive. Delivery-rejection remedies limit aircraft customer lock-in, and distribution-system disruption demonstrates that operational failures can weaken service economics.
What would invalidate the thesis
The thesis would weaken materially if services awards and backlog persistently declined as customers transferred support work elsewhere, or if alternative providers displaced Boeing's training, engineering and technical-support relationships without meaningful switching friction.
Evidence (4) · Counterevidence (3)

Changes since the previous analysis

  • Retain the previous narrow verdict; distinguish the established commercial-aircraft franchise from unproven advantages across defense and services markets.
  • Make contractual pricing constraints explicit and incorporate realized fixed-price losses, continuing commercial-aircraft losses and services disruption.
  • Add evidence-based management assessments using actual incentive payouts, governance practices, financing, capital spending and operating recovery.

Evidence limitations

  • Assessment uses only supplied passages. Source dates are filing dates: January 30, July 28 and March 6, 2026 for the principal annual, interim and proxy evidence; they are not retrieval dates.
  • Competitor arrays are empty because the supplied passages do not explicitly establish named product-market competitors. Airbus SE appears in transaction disclosures, while other names appear as compensation peers, employers or partners; those references do not establish competitive coverage.
  • Engineering and lifecycle-support disclosures support a limited structural inference; quantified customer switching costs, service exclusivity and competitor displacement data are absent.
  • No comparable aircraft transaction-price series or quantified realized escalation and concession effects is supplied. Pricing grades therefore assess disclosed contractual economics and realized loss outcomes, without treating delivery-driven revenue growth as price improvement.
  • Operating results and contractual disclosures support numerical grades, but issuer claims about customer satisfaction, culture change and future acquisition benefits do not establish exceptional performance. Interim financial information is reviewed rather than audited.
  • Proxy passages establish actual incentive outcomes and governance practices, but do not establish executives' complete beneficial ownership or compliance with ownership requirements. Future vesting and anticipated program deliveries remain prospective.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis

Calculated from annual filings. Missing data remains unavailable. Detailed financial charts remain in the other topics.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis
PeriodGross marginOperating marginROICFCF margin
20214.8%-4.7%—-7.1%
20225.3%-5.3%—3.4%
20239.9%-1.0%—5.7%
2024-3.0%-16.1%—-21.5%
20254.8%4.8%8.6%-2.1%

Pricing power38

  • Pricing outcomes

    Fixed-price contracts have produced actual losses, including a 2026 767 reach-forward loss, demonstrating weak realized price-to-cost protection. The passages do not isolate transaction-price changes from cost overruns, so this is a weak contractual pricing outcome rather than evidence of observed price cuts.

  • Customer demand

    777X firm orders increased from 358 to 560 during 2025, first-half commercial deliveries rose from 280 to 314 in 2026, and services backlog increased. These demonstrate strong continuing demand despite execution problems. Retention is assessed indirectly from orders, deliveries and support commitments, not a fabricated customer renewal rate.

  • Margin resilience

    Commercial-aircraft losses narrowed with higher deliveries but remained substantial. Services stayed profitable, although earnings fell despite revenue growth and disclosed ERP disruption reduced margins. Actual losses and operational causes outweigh generic risk language.

  • Pricing freedom

    Firm fixed-price aircraft contracts permit indexed escalation rather than discretionary repricing; escalation outcomes are outside Boeing's control. Customer delivery-rejection remedies further constrain terms. These are disclosed restrictions, not missing evidence.

Management44

  • Capital discipline

    2025 operating cash flow of $1.065 billion did not cover $2.942 billion of capital spending, following much greater 2024 cash consumption and substantial equity financing. The $8.389 billion Spirit consideration adds a large commitment whose returns are unproven. First-half 2026 operating cash generation and absent program buybacks are positives, but improvement was primarily driven by working capital.

  • Incentive alignment

    Actual three-year performance awards paid zero for below-threshold cash flow, without an adjustment, demonstrating some enforcement. Annual incentives nevertheless paid 131% of target. Safety-linked metrics, clawbacks and ownership requirements provide safeguards, but operational scoring discretion and missing actual ownership coverage limit a stronger conclusion.

  • Execution

    Higher delivered aircraft, improved operating cash flow and an authorized T-7A production lot demonstrate recovery. Continuing commercial-aircraft losses, delayed 777X delivery, engine certification work and ERP disruption show material unfinished execution. Cash-flow improvement partly reflects working capital rather than completed operational repair.

  • Governance

    Actual board attendance, independent-director sessions, safety reporting and audited effective financial controls support functioning oversight. The Department of Justice determination that Boeing failed to fulfill earlier prosecution-agreement obligations is realized contrary evidence. Financial-reporting controls do not establish effective product-safety governance.

Sources and methodology

Current publication · Updated 18/10/2026 · Version 3

AI interpretation based on checked source excerpts. Issuer assertions and evidence limitations remain explicit.

Policy quality-scores-2: six equally weighted categories. The overall score requires full coverage. Missing inputs are not zero. Qualitative grades are sourced interpretations, not probabilities. 6/6 · 18/10/2026

Moat50

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

structural advantage · 3/4 · An established position among two major large-aircraft manufacturers, engineering capabilities, regulation and substantial delivered output demonstrate meaningful barriers. This does not establish efficient scale or a cost advantage across Boeing's businesses.

durability · 2/4 · Growing firm orders and aircraft-lifetime support relationships support persistence, but certification delays and unresolved engine durability work constrain confidence in sustained economic returns.

customer dependency · 2/4 · Lifecycle training, engineering and documentation create continuing relationships. Services backlog growth supports continuing demand, but dependence is assessed indirectly; exclusive sourcing and quantified switching costs are absent, and customers retain delivery remedies.

erosion resilience · 1/4 · Orders and deliveries have persisted despite failures, but certification setbacks, realized contract losses and distribution disruption demonstrate fragile protection of economic value. Potential cancellations are a risk rather than evidence of realized mass departures.

Pricing power38

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

realized pricing · 1/4 · Fixed-price contracts have produced actual losses, including a 2026 767 reach-forward loss, demonstrating weak realized price-to-cost protection. The passages do not isolate transaction-price changes from cost overruns, so this is a weak contractual pricing outcome rather than evidence of observed price cuts.

retention · 3/4 · 777X firm orders increased from 358 to 560 during 2025, first-half commercial deliveries rose from 280 to 314 in 2026, and services backlog increased. These demonstrate strong continuing demand despite execution problems. Retention is assessed indirectly from orders, deliveries and support commitments, not a fabricated customer renewal rate.

margin resilience · 1/4 · Commercial-aircraft losses narrowed with higher deliveries but remained substantial. Services stayed profitable, although earnings fell despite revenue growth and disclosed ERP disruption reduced margins. Actual losses and operational causes outweigh generic risk language.

contractual freedom · 1/4 · Firm fixed-price aircraft contracts permit indexed escalation rather than discretionary repricing; escalation outcomes are outside Boeing's control. Customer delivery-rejection remedies further constrain terms. These are disclosed restrictions, not missing evidence.

Predictability60

Five consecutive annual periods. Equal weights: nondeclining revenue frequency; revenue-growth volatility (5–40pp); positive FCF frequency; FCF-margin volatility (3–20pp). Stability indicator, not a growth forecast.

Nondeclining revenue years (%)
75.00
Revenue growth volatility (pp)
17.69
Positive FCF years (%)
40.00
FCF margin volatility (pp)
9.68

Financial strength10

Equal-weight grades: debt/FCF (1–8x), net debt/earnings before interest and tax (0–5x), interest service (1–12x), current ratio (0.75–2x). Earnings use reported operating income, or reported pretax profit plus reported interest expense when operating income is unavailable. Interest service uses earnings/interest expense; if unavailable, it uses reported operating cash flow/cash interest paid, without relabeling cash paid as accrued expense. Nonpositive cash flow/earnings score 0 for their service component; reported zero interest with a positive numerator scores 100. Net cash scores 100 for net leverage. Missing disclosures remain unavailable. General nonfinancial-company rubric, not a credit rating; exceptional and nonoperating gains are not normalized out. IFRS finance-cost and cash-flow classifications retain their reported scope.

debtFcfGrade
0.00
netDebtEbitGrade
0.00
interestCoverageGrade
4.95
currentRatioGrade
35.05
Net debt / operating income (x)
10.09
Interest coverage (x)
1.54
Current ratio (x)
1.19

Capital allocation25

Three-year equal-weight indicators: pretax return on average invested capital (0–25%; equity + debt − cash, each year and its prior year), share-count growth (0–5%, lower better), share-based cost/revenue (2–20%, lower better), consolidated FCF/net income (0–1x). Return uses reported operating income or, if unavailable, EBIT calculated from reported pretax profit plus reported interest expense; exceptional/nonoperating gains are not normalized out. Share-based cost uses the reported cash-flow add-back or, if absent, separately reported recognized compensation expense; the latter never becomes an FCF adjustment. Nonpositive net income scores 0 for cash conversion; absent income/FCF stays unavailable. Nonpositive invested capital has no defined return and remains unavailable. Does not establish acquisition quality or buyback timing.

3-year pre-tax operating return (%)
-9.88
3-year average dilution (%)
8.69
3-year average SBC / revenue (%)
0.66
cashConversionGrade
0.00

Management44

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

capital discipline · 1/4 · 2025 operating cash flow of $1.065 billion did not cover $2.942 billion of capital spending, following much greater 2024 cash consumption and substantial equity financing. The $8.389 billion Spirit consideration adds a large commitment whose returns are unproven. First-half 2026 operating cash generation and absent program buybacks are positives, but improvement was primarily driven by working capital.

incentive alignment · 2/4 · Actual three-year performance awards paid zero for below-threshold cash flow, without an adjustment, demonstrating some enforcement. Annual incentives nevertheless paid 131% of target. Safety-linked metrics, clawbacks and ownership requirements provide safeguards, but operational scoring discretion and missing actual ownership coverage limit a stronger conclusion.

execution · 2/4 · Higher delivered aircraft, improved operating cash flow and an authorized T-7A production lot demonstrate recovery. Continuing commercial-aircraft losses, delayed 777X delivery, engine certification work and ERP disruption show material unfinished execution. Cash-flow improvement partly reflects working capital rather than completed operational repair.

governance · 2/4 · Actual board attendance, independent-director sessions, safety reporting and audited effective financial controls support functioning oversight. The Department of Justice determination that Boeing failed to fulfill earlier prosecution-agreement obligations is realized contrary evidence. Financial-reporting controls do not establish effective product-safety governance.

Evidence

We are one of the two major manufacturers of 100+ seat airplanes for the worldwide commercial airline industry and one of the largest defense contractors in the U.S.

MD&A / Overview / commercial-aircraft market position · Filed 30/01/2026

Regulatory Matters Our businesses are heavily regulated in most of our markets.

Business / Regulatory Matters · Filed 30/01/2026

Unpatented research, development and engineering skills, as well as certain trademarks, trade secrets and other intellectual property rights, also make an important contribution to our business.

Business / Intellectual Property / engineering skills · Filed 30/01/2026

Cumulative firm orders for the 777X increased from 358 units at December 31, 2024, to 560 units at December 31, 2025.

MD&A / 777 and 777X Programs / cumulative firm orders · Filed 30/01/2026

BCA total backlog of $567,290 million at December 31, 2025 increased from $435,175 million at December 31, 2024, reflecting new orders in excess of deliveries and a decrease in the value of existing orders that, in our assessment, do not meet the accounting requirements of ASC 606 for inclusion in backlog, partially offset by cancellations.

MD&A / Commercial Airplanes / backlog · Filed 30/01/2026

Commercial airplane deliveries, including intercompany deliveries, were as follows: 737 * 767 * 777 787 Total Deliveries during the first six months of 2026 243 (3) 16 (9) 15 40 314 Deliveries during the first six months of 2025 209 (3) 14 (7) 20 37 280 Deliveries during the second quarter of 2026 129 (2) 10 (6) 7 25 171 Deliveries during the second quarter of 2025 104 (2) 9 (4) 13 24 150 Cumulative deliveries as of 6/30/2026 9,483 1,367 1,791 1,289 Cumulative deliveries as of 12/31/2025 9,240 1,351 1,776 1,249 * Intercompany deliveries identified by parentheses.

MD&A / Commercial Airplanes / deliveries · Filed 28/07/2026

Collectively known as fleet support services, these activities and services begin prior to airplane delivery and continue throughout the operational life of the airplane.

MD&A / Fleet Support / operational-life support · Filed 30/01/2026

They include flight and maintenance training, field service support, engineering services, information services and systems and technical data and documents.

MD&A / Fleet Support / training and technical services · Filed 30/01/2026

BGS total backlog increased from $29,720 million at December 31, 2025 to $32,840 million at June 30, 2026, primarily due to the timing of awards, partially offset by revenue recognized on contracts awarded in prior years.

MD&A / Global Services / backlog and awards · Filed 28/07/2026

BGS expects the market to remain highly competitive in 2026, and intends to grow market share by leveraging a high level of customer satisfaction and productivity.

Business / Global Services / competition and management intentions · Filed 30/01/2026

36 Table of Contents In the third quarter of 2025, we reassessed the anticipated timing to complete FAA certification flight testing and delayed first delivery of the 777-9 to 2027.

MD&A / 777X / first-delivery delay · Filed 30/01/2026

We continue to work with our supplier and the FAA to incorporate and certify their solution related to the engine durability issue identified in 2025.

MD&A / 777X / engine durability and certification · Filed 28/07/2026

We continue to expect first delivery of the 777-9 to occur in 2027.

MD&A / 777X / expected first delivery · Filed 28/07/2026

We enter into firm fixed-price aircraft sales contracts with indexed price escalation clauses, which subjects us to losses if we have cost overruns or if increases in our costs exceed the applicable escalation rate.

Risk Factors / fixed-price aircraft contracts and escalation clauses · Filed 30/01/2026

Our revenue estimates are based on current expectations with respect to these escalation formulas, but the actual escalation amounts are outside of our control.

Risk Factors / escalation amounts outside Boeing's control · Filed 30/01/2026

A number of our customers may have contractual remedies, including rights to reject individual airplane deliveries if the actual delivery date is significantly later than the contractual delivery date.

MD&A / backlog / customer delivery-rejection remedies · Filed 30/01/2026

government. Fixed-Price Contracts Long-term contracts that are contracted on a fixed-price basis or have fixed-price options have resulted in losses being recorded in prior periods and could result in losses in future periods.

Note 10 / Fixed-Price Contracts / recorded losses · Filed 28/07/2026

This program recorded a reach-forward loss of $40 million during the first half of 2026 and $191 million in the same period in 2025.

MD&A / 767 Program / realized reach-forward losses · Filed 28/07/2026

6 Table of Contents The Boeing Company and Subsidiaries Notes to Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements Summary of Business Segment Data (Unaudited) (Dollars in millions) Six months ended June 30 Three months ended June 30 2026 2025 2026 2025 Revenues: Commercial Airplanes $20,954 $19,021 $11,751 $10,874 Defense, Space & Security 15,082 12,915 7,483 6,617 Global Services 10,714 10,344 5,344 5,281 Unallocated items, eliminations and other 27 (35) (18) (23) Total revenues $46,777 $42,245 $24,560 $22,749 Earnings/(loss) from operations: Commercial Airplanes ($885) ($1,094) ($322) ($557) Defense, Space & Security 218 265 (15) 110 Global Services 1,939 1,992 968 1,049 Segment operating earnings 1,272 1,163 631 602 Unallocated items, eliminations and other (978) (1,397) (630) (1,035) FAS/CAS service cost adjustment 310 519 155 257 Earnings/(loss) from operations 604 285 156 (176) Other income, net 273 648 79 325 Interest and debt expense (1,216) (1,418) (600) (710) Loss before income taxes (339) (485) (365) (561) Income tax expense (96) (158) (63) (51) Net loss (435) (643) (428) (612) Less: Net earnings/(loss) attributable to noncontrolling interest 13 5 16 (1) Net loss attributable to Boeing shareholders (448) (648) (444) (611) Less: Mandatory convertible preferred stock dividends accumulated during the period 172 172 86 86 Net loss attributable to Boeing common shareholders ($620) ($820) ($530) ($697) This information is an integral part of the Notes to the Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements.

Summary of Business Segment Data / revenue and operating results · Filed 28/07/2026

The year-over-year reduction in operating margins reflects the Digital Aviation Solutions Divestiture and ongoing disruption in one of our distribution businesses resulting from the transition to a new enterprise resource planning system in late 2025.

MD&A / Global Services / margin reduction and ERP disruption · Filed 28/07/2026

(dollars in millions) Years ended December 31, 2025 2024 Operating cash flow (GAAP) $1,065 ($12,080 ) Less additions to property, plant & equipment ($2,942 ) ($2,230 ) Free cash flow (non-GAAP) ($1,877 ) ($14,310 ) Core earnings/(loss) per share is defined as GAAP Diluted earnings/(loss) per share excluding the net earnings/(loss) per share impact of the FAS/CAS service cost adjustment and non-operating pension and postretirement expenses.

Appendix A / operating cash flow, capital expenditures and free cash flow · Filed 06/03/2026

Operating Activities Net cash provided by operating activities was $1.2 billion during the six months ended June 30, 2026, compared with cash used of $1.4 billion during the same period in 2025, primarily driven by favorable changes in working capital.

MD&A / Liquidity / operating cash flow · Filed 28/07/2026

Changes in assets and liabilities during the six months ended June 30, 2026, improved by $2.1 billion compared with the same period in 2025, primarily driven by favorable changes in Advances and progress billings ($5.3 billion) and Accounts payable ($1.4 billion), partially offset by unfavorable changes in Inventories ($3.5 billion), Other current assets ($0.9 billion), and Accrued liabilities ($0.8 billion).

MD&A / Liquidity / working-capital changes · Filed 28/07/2026

On October 30, 2024, we issued 129,375,000 shares of common stock, $5.00 par value per share, from shares held in Treasury Stock.

Note 20 / Shareholders' Equity / 2024 common-stock issuance · Filed 30/01/2026

As a result of the transaction, we received cash proceeds of $18,181, net of underwriting fees and other issuance costs.

Note 20 / Shareholders' Equity / common-stock financing proceeds · Filed 30/01/2026

Total consideration for the Spirit Acquisition was $8,389 comprised of the following: Boeing common stock exchanged for Spirit common stock (1) $4,704 Settlement of loans, advances and other payments to Spirit 2,589 Debt repaid on Spirit’s behalf 948 Premium on assumed Spirit Exchangeable Notes 109 Exchange of Spirit share-based awards (1) 39 Fair value of total consideration $8,389 (1) Fair value of consideration reflects the price per share of Boeing common stock on the acquisition date.

Note 2 / Spirit Acquisition / consideration and financing components · Filed 28/07/2026

• Our annual incentive plan payout at 131% of target was driven by significant improvement in financial and operational performance during 2025 • Payout of 0% for three-year performance stock units (PSUs) granted in 2023 was aligned to below-threshold performance against three-year cumulative free cash flow goals over the 2023-2025 performance period In 2025, we adopted a single enterprise-wide incentive structure—the One Company Score—to govern annual incentive payouts for our executive leadership team and a significant portion of our global workforce.

Compensation Discussion and Analysis / actual incentive payouts · Filed 06/03/2026

The Compensation Committee did not make any adjustments to this compensation outcome, which was aligned to the company’s performance over the period and consistent with our commitment to pay for performance.

Compensation Discussion and Analysis / no adjustment to failed performance-award outcome · Filed 06/03/2026

Relevant features of these programs include: ✓ Benchmarking of individual executive pay against market data for comparable executive roles at an appropriate set of peer companies; ✓ Incorporation of an individual performance assessment for executives in the annual incentive calculation, thereby enabling the Compensation Committee to direct a reduced or zero payout to any executive in any year, including if the executive is deemed to have sufficiently poor performance, is found to have engaged in activities or misconduct that pose a financial, operational or other undue risk to the company, or otherwise fails to adhere to our core Values and Behaviors; ✓ Consultation between the Compensation Committee and Aerospace Safety Committee on appropriate safety-related metrics for incentive programs and individual performance assessments for our executive officers; ✓ The use of multiple metrics in incentive plans, sharpening our executives’ focus on the areas within their control that best drive long-term shareholder value; ✓ Incorporation of operational performance alongside financial performance into our annual incentive plan design to drive improvements in areas critical to safety and execution; ✓ A robust clawback policy permitting the recoupment of past incentive pay from executive officers in the event of instances of misconduct, even absent a restatement of financial results, including misconduct that has compromised the safety of our products or services, and forfeiture of incentive awards and certain other compensation in the event the executive engages in various types of conduct deemed detrimental to the company’s interests, including theft or fraud against the company and engaging in competition with the company; 62 2026 Proxy Statement Table of Contents COMPENSATION DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ✓ No employment agreements with executive officers (except where required by non-U.S.

Compensation Discussion and Analysis / incentive features and clawback policy · Filed 06/03/2026

law); ✓ Compensation Committee-approved limits on annual incentive awards; ✓ Compensation Committee annual and ongoing review of our compensation plans and programs as advised by its independent compensation consultant; ✓ Significant share ownership requirements for senior executives, monitored by the Compensation Committee, to ensure alignment with shareholder interests over the long term; ✓ Adjustments to reported financial results impacting incentive plan payouts are limited to circumstances where such adjustments are necessary to more accurately reflect the core operating performance of the company, based on criteria established at the start of the performance period; and ✓ Restrictions on trading in Boeing stock to reduce insider trading compliance risk, as well as prohibitions on pledging, hedging and monetization transactions involving Boeing stock.

Compensation Discussion and Analysis / ownership requirements and trading restrictions · Filed 06/03/2026

Each incumbent director attended at least 86% of the aggregate of meetings of the Board and the committees on which he or she served during 2025, and average aggregate attendance at these meetings exceeded 96%.

Corporate Governance / actual director attendance · Filed 06/03/2026

Independent directors met in executive sessions, led by our independent Board Chair, after every regularly scheduled Board meeting.

Corporate Governance / independent-director executive sessions · Filed 06/03/2026

The CASO reports to the Aerospace Safety Committee at each regular meeting and to the full Board at least twice annually.

Corporate Governance / Chief Aerospace Safety Office reporting · Filed 06/03/2026

On May 29, 2025, Boeing and the Department of Justice (the Department) entered into a non-prosecution agreement (the Agreement) to resolve the Department’s determination that Boeing did not fulfill its obligations under the January 2021 deferred prosecution agreement relating to the October 2018 Lion Air flight 610 accident and the March 2019 Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 accident (the MAX accidents).

Note 23 / Legal Proceedings / failure to fulfill deferred-prosecution obligations · Filed 30/01/2026

In our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2025, based on criteria established in Internal Control — Integrated Framework (2013) issued by COSO.

Independent auditor report / effective internal control over financial reporting · Filed 30/01/2026

During the three months ended June 30, 2026, the USAF approved Milestone C and authorized the first LRIP lot for a total of 14 aircraft.

Note 10 / T-7A / approved milestone and authorized production lot · Filed 28/07/2026

We did not purchase any shares of our common stock in the open market pursuant to a repurchase program.

Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities / no open-market program purchases · Filed 28/07/2026

We may experience reductions to backlog and/or significant order cancellations due to various factors including delivery delays, production disruptions and delays to entry into service of the 777X, 737-7 and/or 737-10.

Notes / backlog / potential cancellations from delays · Filed 28/07/2026

Publication history

Publication history
VersionUpdatedCompetitive advantage
318/10/2026narrow
218/10/2026narrow
118/10/2026Unavailable

Sources

Research methodology and limitations · What is an economic moat?