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JPMorgan Chase

NYSE: JPM · USD

JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Economic Moat Analysis63

Competitive advantages, dated evidence and erosion risks.

Narrow economic moat

JPMorgan Chase has a narrow moat from its established brand, distribution and institutional franchise. Seventeen years of global investment-banking fee leadership, substantial payments share, branch referrals and sustained asset inflows demonstrate current advantages. The passages do not establish superior funding costs, network effects or strong customer lock-in. Pricing power is mixed: higher annual card fees coexist with narrower private-bank loan spreads and lower year-to-date card income. Missing regulatory ratios and liquidity amounts prevent an assessment of current capital and liquidity sufficiency.

Intangible assets

The established brand, client relationships and distribution franchise support customer acquisition and recurring business. Evidence includes 17 consecutive years leading global investment-banking fees, 8.4% fee wallet share in 2025, 30.2% USD SWIFT share, substantial asset inflows and frequent mortgage referrals through Chase branches. These demonstrate franchise strength, although they do not isolate its contribution from price, market conditions or spending.

Durability
The investment-banking leadership history and five-year client-flow ranking support persistence beyond one favorable year. Continued 2026 inflows and transaction growth reinforce the current advantage. The evidence supports a narrow moat without establishing exceptional durability across the entire bank.
Competitors
American Express, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo
Erosion risks
Digital competitors and disintermediation require continuing investment. Actual erosion signals include narrower private-bank loan spreads, declining fund-performance rankings and expense growth exceeding revenue growth in CCB. Payments share alone does not establish a proprietary network effect.
What would invalidate the thesis
The thesis would be undermined by sustained investment-banking wallet-share losses from the disclosed 8.4% baseline, persistent net client outflows, falling payments share from 30.2%, and repeated pricing concessions accompanied by weaker client activity despite continued investment.
Evidence (9) · Counterevidence (5)

Changes since the previous analysis

  • Retained the previous narrow-moat verdict; the supplied passages support franchise advantages without establishing a wide moat.
  • Added named competitors from explicit proxy disclosures of competition for business and talent; these do not establish head-to-head superiority in every product.
  • Added management assessments using actual compensation awards, performance conditions, shareholder rights and committee activity.
  • Added qualitative bank financial assessments while retaining null grades for capital adequacy and liquidity funding because the passages omit the necessary ratios and liquidity amounts.

Evidence limitations

  • All sources are issuer filings. Reported operating results and disclosed contractual arrangements support numerical grades, but management praise and fortress-balance-sheet descriptions are not independent verification.
  • The supplied dates are filing dates: February 13, August 6, April 6 and May 1, 2026 for filings 1, 2, 3 and 6 respectively. Their financial evidence is within 550 days of October 18, 2026. Filing 4, dated February 14, 2025, is older and is used only for historical share-count comparison.
  • The catalog supplies regulatory-ratio headings and identifies binding capital approaches but omits ratio values, applicable numerical requirements, available liquidity and funding concentration. Balance-sheet size cannot substitute for these disclosures.
  • CCB and AWM figures are segment evidence and cannot be treated as consolidated bank results. Managed revenue and ROTCE are identified as non-GAAP measures.
  • Client retention and dependency are assessed indirectly from inflows, recurring transaction activity and distribution referrals; no customer retention rate or quantified switching cost is disclosed.
  • Higher annual-fee revenue does not establish a like-for-like card price increase. Volume, product mix, market levels and internal funds transfer pricing affect observed revenue.
  • Named competitors are established in the proxy, but product-specific competitive comparisons and digital-competitor coverage remain incomplete. Visa and Mastercard appear in litigation passages and are not treated as established competitors.
  • The amended interchange settlement had preliminary approval as disclosed in August 2026; final approval and its eventual economic effect are not established.
  • Compensation conditions describe awarded incentives and potential future vesting, not completed vesting or demonstrated clawback enforcement. Exact executive ownership amounts and complete compensation-cost data are absent.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis

Calculated from annual filings. Missing data remains unavailable. Detailed financial charts remain in the other topics.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis
PeriodGross marginOperating marginROICFCF margin
2021————
2022————
2023————
2024————
2025————

Pricing power56

  • Pricing outcomes

    Higher annual-fee revenue partly offset weaker card income, while private-bank loan spreads narrowed. Deposit-margin improvement partly reflected internal transfer pricing. These are mixed observed outcomes, without proof of broad like-for-like price increases.

  • Customer demand

    Substantial long-term asset inflows, a strong five-year flow ranking, continued 2026 inflows and growing transaction activity demonstrate sustained demand indirectly. These measures do not isolate existing-customer retention or response to fee changes.

  • Margin resilience

    CCB remained highly profitable and increased first-half earnings, but its overhead ratio rose from 53% to 55% and ROE declined from 34% to 33%. Narrower private-bank spreads further limit evidence of resilient pricing economics.

  • Pricing freedom

    Market-making disclosures establish discretion over bid and offer prices. Contractual interest-rate ceilings and floors constrain some products, while interchange litigation demonstrates external constraints. Broad unilateral repricing rights are not supplied.

Management69

  • Capital discipline

    Strong reported earnings, actual repurchases, rising common equity and investment spending provide evidence of active capital management. Missing regulatory headroom, investment-level returns and repurchase valuation evidence prevent a stronger discipline assessment.

  • Incentive alignment

    Actual 2025 awards for specified Operating Committee members placed 60% of incentives in long-term equity. PSU performance periods, additional holding requirements, recovery conditions and hedging restrictions establish meaningful alignment. Vesting outcomes and enforcement effectiveness remain unproven.

  • Execution

    Eight consecutive record managed-revenue years, $57 billion of 2025 net income, persistent investment-banking leadership and first-half 2026 CCB earnings growth demonstrate execution. Assessment uses operating outcomes indirectly; favorable markets and rising costs limit attribution to management.

  • Governance

    Independent principal committees, executive sessions, shareholder rights and actual committee meeting activity establish substantive oversight arrangements. Combined Chairman and CEO roles concentrate authority, and procedural disclosures do not prove that every control operated effectively.

Sources and methodology

Current publication · Updated 18/10/2026 · Version 4

AI interpretation based on checked source excerpts. Issuer assertions and evidence limitations remain explicit.

Policy quality-scores-2: six equally weighted categories. The overall score requires full coverage. Missing inputs are not zero. Qualitative grades are sourced interpretations, not probabilities. 5/6 · 18/10/2026

Moat63

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

structural advantage · 3/4 · Longstanding investment-banking leadership, payments share, asset inflows and branch referrals demonstrate an established franchise. Attribution to brand and relationships is an assessment; superior unit costs and network effects are unproven.

durability · 3/4 · Seventeen consecutive years leading investment-banking fees and a top-two five-year client-flow ranking demonstrate persistence. This history does not guarantee future leadership or exceptional durability throughout the bank.

customer dependency · 2/4 · Recurring transaction activity, inflows and branch referrals indicate relationship value indirectly. The passages do not demonstrate essential dependence, exclusivity or substantial switching barriers.

erosion resilience · 2/4 · Continuing inflows and earnings growth show resilience, but narrower lending spreads, weaker fund rankings and rising CCB overhead demonstrate pressures. Technology disruption is a prospective risk rather than a demonstrated franchise collapse.

Pricing power56

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

realized pricing · 2/4 · Higher annual-fee revenue partly offset weaker card income, while private-bank loan spreads narrowed. Deposit-margin improvement partly reflected internal transfer pricing. These are mixed observed outcomes, without proof of broad like-for-like price increases.

retention · 3/4 · Substantial long-term asset inflows, a strong five-year flow ranking, continued 2026 inflows and growing transaction activity demonstrate sustained demand indirectly. These measures do not isolate existing-customer retention or response to fee changes.

margin resilience · 2/4 · CCB remained highly profitable and increased first-half earnings, but its overhead ratio rose from 53% to 55% and ROE declined from 34% to 33%. Narrower private-bank spreads further limit evidence of resilient pricing economics.

contractual freedom · 2/4 · Market-making disclosures establish discretion over bid and offer prices. Contractual interest-rate ceilings and floors constrain some products, while interchange litigation demonstrates external constraints. Broad unilateral repricing rights are not supplied.

Predictability97

Financial-sector stability over five consecutive reported annual periods: equal weights for nondeclining revenue frequency, revenue-growth volatility (5–40pp), positive consolidated earnings frequency, and net-income/revenue margin volatility (3–20pp). Uses reported accounting scope; not industrial FCF or a growth forecast.

Nondeclining revenue years (%)
100.00
Revenue growth volatility (pp)
7.70
positiveEarningsShare
100.00
netMarginStdDev
3.60

Financial strength—

Insufficient current sector evidence for every criterion; no category score is inferred.

capital adequacy · — · The June 2026 disclosure identifies Advanced Total Capital as the binding total-capital constraint but supplies neither actual capital ratios nor applicable numerical requirements and buffers. Current regulatory sufficiency cannot be established.

liquidity funding · — · AWM deposit growth provides limited segment evidence, but available liquidity, consolidated deposit stability, funding concentration and numerical liquidity ratios are absent. Risk-management descriptions cannot establish funding sufficiency.

asset liability risk · 2/4 · Actual CCB charge-offs increased modestly with loan growth; wholesale credit-quality changes required an allowance addition. AWM nonaccrual ratios improved, but this is only one segment. Deposit repricing uncertainty remains, and quantified firmwide interest-rate sensitivities are missing.

earnings resilience · 3/4 · The bank reported $57 billion of consolidated 2025 net income, followed by higher first-half 2026 CCB earnings despite cost growth and credit provisions. This demonstrates strong earnings over the supplied period, without a complete consolidated 2026 or severe-stress comparison.

Capital allocation56

Qualitative bank assessment: equal-weight average of four current evidence-backed grades (0–4), scaled to 100. Policy financial-industry-1; not an industrial ratio score or credit rating.

capital efficiency · 3/4 · Reported 2025 consolidated ROE of 17% and non-GAAP ROTCE of 20% demonstrate strong equity returns. CCB's first-half 2026 ROE of 33% uses allocated segment equity and is not a consolidated return. Through-cycle capital efficiency is less fully established.

distributions and buffers · 2/4 · Actual 2025 repurchases of $31.64 billion and the dividend increase occurred alongside $57 billion of net income and higher common equity. First-half 2026 repurchases totaled $15.031 billion. Missing regulatory headroom and consolidated 2026 earnings prevent a stronger assessment of distributions against buffers.

dilution and cost · 2/4 · The current filing reports approximately 2.697 billion shares outstanding versus the historical 2.796 billion comparison, supporting net share reduction. CCB compensation and other expenses grew faster than revenue. Complete firmwide share-compensation expense and financing-cost effects are absent.

investment discipline · 2/4 · Actual technology, marketing and banker investment accompanied higher CCB revenue and earnings but a worsening overhead ratio. The First Republic purchase-price settlement was completed with a disclosed payment and gain; that accounting outcome does not establish the acquisition's full economic return.

Management69

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

capital discipline · 2/4 · Strong reported earnings, actual repurchases, rising common equity and investment spending provide evidence of active capital management. Missing regulatory headroom, investment-level returns and repurchase valuation evidence prevent a stronger discipline assessment.

incentive alignment · 3/4 · Actual 2025 awards for specified Operating Committee members placed 60% of incentives in long-term equity. PSU performance periods, additional holding requirements, recovery conditions and hedging restrictions establish meaningful alignment. Vesting outcomes and enforcement effectiveness remain unproven.

execution · 3/4 · Eight consecutive record managed-revenue years, $57 billion of 2025 net income, persistent investment-banking leadership and first-half 2026 CCB earnings growth demonstrate execution. Assessment uses operating outcomes indirectly; favorable markets and rising costs limit attribution to management.

governance · 3/4 · Independent principal committees, executive sessions, shareholder rights and actual committee meeting activity establish substantive oversight arrangements. Combined Chairman and CEO roles concentrate authority, and procedural disclosures do not prove that every control operated effectively.

Evidence

Under the J.P. Morgan and Chase brands, the Firm serves millions of customers, predominantly in the U.S., and many of the world’s most prominent corporate, institutional and government clients globally.

Business overview: brands and customer reach · Filed 13/02/2026

•#1 in global IB fees for 17 consecutive years, with 8.4% wallet share5 in 2025

Executive compensation performance summary: investment-banking leadership and wallet share · Filed 06/04/2026

•#1 in USD payments volume with 30.2% USD SWIFT market share5

Executive compensation performance summary: USD payments share · Filed 06/04/2026

•Long-term AUM flows of $209B; top 2 rank in Client Asset Flows6 over a 5-year period

Executive compensation performance summary: asset flows and five-year ranking · Filed 06/04/2026

Borrowers are frequently referred to a mortgage banker by a banker in a Chase branch, real estate brokers, home builders or other third parties.

Mortgage origination channels: branch and third-party referrals · Filed 06/08/2026

Lending- and deposit-related fees increased, reflecting: •in CIB, higher deposit-related fees, primarily cash management fees, and higher lending-related fees, primarily loan commitment fees, both as a result of higher volume, and •in CCB, higher deposit-related fees as a result of higher transaction volume and new accounts.

Consolidated results: volume-driven lending and deposit fees · Filed 06/08/2026

Asset management fees increased driven by higher average market levels and net inflows in AWM and CCB.

Consolidated results: asset-management fees and net inflows · Filed 06/08/2026

In evaluating market data for OC members, the CMDC benchmarks against our primary financial services peer group, which consists of large financial services companies with which the Firm directly competes for both talent and business.

Compensation benchmarking: direct competition for talent and business · Filed 06/04/2026

The following companies comprise our primary financial services peer group, which remains unchanged from last year: •American Express •Bank of America •Citigroup •Goldman Sachs •Morgan Stanley •Wells Fargo Given the diversity of the Firm’s businesses, the CMDC may also periodically reference the pay plans and practices of other financial services companies as well as leading large, global firms across multiple industries.

Compensation benchmarking: named financial-services peers · Filed 06/04/2026

Furthermore, both financial institutions and their non-banking competitors face the risk of disruption to payments processing and other products and services from the use of new technologies that may not require intermediation, such as tokenized securities or other products that leverage distributed ledger technology.

Competition risk: technological disintermediation · Filed 13/02/2026

New technologies have required and could require JPMorganChase to increase expenditures to modify its products to attract and retain clients and customers or to match products and services offered by its competitors, including technology companies.

Competition risk: required technology expenditures · Filed 13/02/2026

Revenue from Global Private Bank was $6.8 billion, up 12%, reflecting: •higher noninterest revenue, predominantly driven by higher management fees due to strong net inflows and higher average market levels, as well as higher brokerage commissions, and •higher net interest income driven by higher average loans, largely offset by narrower spreads on loans.

AWM results: private-bank growth, inflows and narrower loan spreads · Filed 06/08/2026

36 Selected metrics As of or for the three months ended June 30, As of or for the six months ended June 30, (in millions, except ranking data, ratios and employees) 2026 2025 Change 2026 2025 Change % of JPM mutual fund assets and ETFs rated as 4- or 5-star(a) 58 % 68 % 58 % 68 % % of JPM mutual fund assets and ETFs ranked in 1st or 2nd quartile:(b) 1 year 45 47 45 47 3 years 61 79 61 79 5 years 70 79 70 79 Selected balance sheet data (period-end)(c) Total assets $ 323,243 $ 268,966 20 % $ 323,243 $ 268,966 20 % Loans 293,386 245,526 19 293,386 245,526 19 Deposits 253,218 242,356 4 253,218 242,356 4 Equity 16,000 16,000 — 16,000 16,000 — Selected balance sheet data (average)(c) Total assets $ 308,845 $ 261,128 18 $ 300,001 $ 257,271 17 Loans 284,281 240,585 18 276,178 237,279 16 Deposits 260,092 248,375 5 256,916 246,253 4 Equity 16,000 16,000 — 16,000 16,000 — Employees 29,773 28,770 (d) 3 29,773 28,770 (d) 3 Number of Global Private Bank client advisors 4,119 3,756 10 4,119 3,756 10 Credit data and quality statistics(c) Net charge-offs/(recoveries) $ 2 $ (1) NM $ 3 $ — NM Nonaccrual loans 1,041 1,035 1 1,041 1,035 1 Allowance for credit losses: Allowance for loan losses $ 530 $ 552 (4) $ 530 $ 552 (4) Allowance for lending-related commitments 35 58 (40) 35 58 (40) Total allowance for credit losses $ 565 $ 610 (7) % $ 565 $ 610 (7) % Net charge-off/(recovery) rate — % — % — % — % Allowance for loan losses to period-end loans 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22 Allowance for loan losses to nonaccrual loans 51 53 51 53 Nonaccrual loans to period-end loans 0.35 0.42 0.35 0.42 (a)Represents the Morningstar Rating for all domiciled funds except for Japan domiciled funds which use Nomura.

AWM selected metrics: fund rankings, deposits and credit quality · Filed 06/08/2026

Selected income statement data Three months ended June 30, Six months ended June 30, (in millions, except ratios) 2026 2025 Change 2026 2025 Change Revenue Lending- and deposit-related fees $ 971 $ 888 9 % $ 1,918 $ 1,727 11 % Asset management fees 1,379 1,110 24 2,682 2,203 22 Mortgage fees and related income 325 347 (6) 628 610 3 Card income 691 687 1 1,283 1,340 (4) All other income(a) 1,814 1,420 28 3,499 2,743 28 Noninterest revenue 5,180 4,452 16 10,010 8,623 16 Net interest income 15,092 14,395 5 29,830 28,537 5 Total net revenue 20,272 18,847 8 39,840 37,160 7 Provision for credit losses 2,156 2,082 4 4,206 4,711 (11) Noninterest expense Compensation expense 4,682 4,260 (e) 10 9,304 8,635 (e) 8 Noncompensation expense(b)(c) 6,426 5,598 (e) 15 12,783 11,080 (e) 15 Total noninterest expense 11,108 9,858 13 22,087 19,715 12 Income before income tax expense 7,008 6,907 1 13,547 12,734 6 Income tax expense 1,697 1,738 (2) 3,260 3,140 4 Net income $ 5,311 $ 5,169 3 $ 10,287 $ 9,594 7 Revenue by business Banking & Wealth Management $ 11,229 $ 10,698 5 $ 21,806 $ 20,952 4 Home Lending 1,285 1,250 3 2,517 2,457 2 Card Services & Auto 7,758 6,899 12 15,517 13,751 13 Mortgage fees and related income details: Production revenue 147 151 (3) 325 261 25 Net mortgage servicing revenue(d) 178 196 (9) 303 349 (13) Mortgage fees and related income $ 325 $ 347 (6) % $ 628 $ 610 3 % Financial ratios Return on equity 34 % 36 % 33 % 34 % Overhead ratio 55 52 55 53 (a)Primarily includes operating lease income and commissions and other fees.

CCB selected income statement: earnings, expenses, ROE and overhead ratio · Filed 06/08/2026

Noninterest revenue was $10.0 billion, up 16%, driven by: •higher auto operating lease income as a result of growth in volume, and •in BWM, higher asset management fees, reflecting higher average market levels and net inflows, as well as higher deposit-related fees as a result of higher transaction volume and new accounts, partially offset by •lower card income, driven by an increase in amortization related to new account origination costs and lower net interchange, predominantly offset by higher annual fees.

CCB year-to-date results: card income, annual fees and account-origination costs · Filed 06/08/2026

Principal transactions revenue: Principal transactions revenue is driven by many factors, including the bid-offer spread, which is the difference between the price at which the Firm is willing to buy a financial or other instrument and the price at which the Firm is willing to sell that instrument.

Glossary: market-making bid-offer pricing · Filed 06/08/2026

experience, interest rate reset dates and maturities, rate indices used for repricing, and any interest rate ceilings or floors for adjustable rate products.

Structural interest-rate risk: contractual rate ceilings and floors · Filed 13/02/2026

In June 2024, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied preliminary approval of a settlement of the injunctive class action in which Visa and Mastercard agreed to certain changes to their respective network rules and system-wide reductions in interchange rates for U.S.-based merchants.

Interchange litigation: proposed network-rule and rate changes in rejected 2024 settlement · Filed 06/08/2026

In June 2026, the District Court granted preliminary approval of a superseding and amended class settlement between those parties, and has set a hearing on final approval of that settlement in November 2026.

Interchange litigation: preliminary approval of amended settlement in June 2026 · Filed 06/08/2026

The Firm achieved record managed revenue of $185.6 billion, net income of $57.0 billion, a return on equity of 17%, and a return on tangible common equity of 20% .

Lead Independent Director letter: 2025 consolidated earnings and equity returns · Filed 06/04/2026

Shares repurchased pursuant to the common share repurchase programs during 2025 were as follows: Year ended December 31, 2025 Total number of shares of common stock repurchased Average price paid per share of common stock(a) Aggregate purchase price of common stock repurchases (in millions)(a) Dollar value of remaining authorized repurchase (in millions)(a) First quarter 29,953,620 $ 252.50 $ 7,563 $ 11,763 Second quarter 29,800,960 251.67 7,500 4,263 (b) Third quarter 27,987,016 297.10 8,315 41,685 October 9,814,682 304.63 2,990 38,695 November 7,923,457 307.82 2,439 36,256 December 8,928,561 317.28 2,833 33,423 (c) Fourth quarter 26,666,700 309.81 8,262 33,423 (c) Full year 114,408,296 $ 276.55 $ 31,640 $ 33,423 (c) (a)Excludes excise tax and commissions.

Common-share repurchases: actual 2025 purchases · Filed 13/02/2026

Three months ended June 30, Six months ended June 30, (in millions) 2026 2025 2026 2025 Total number of shares of common stock repurchased 21.7 29.8 49.3 59.8 Aggregate purchase price of common stock repurchases(a) $ 6,703 $ 7,500 $ 15,031 $ 15,063 (a)Excludes excise tax and commissions.

Capital actions: actual first-half 2026 share repurchases · Filed 06/08/2026

Per the Firm’s mix, the OC members were awarded 60% of their incentive compensation in long-term equity (with 30% in PSUs and 30% in RSUs), and the remaining 40% paid in cash.

Compensation discussion: awarded 2025 incentive mix for specified Operating Committee members · Filed 06/04/2026

Our PSU program spans a 5-year time horizon PSU goal is set at beginning of performance period Performance Year 3-Year Post-Grant Performance Period (cliff-vest) + 2-Year Additional Hold on Fully Vested Awards 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Award is determined Payout is calculated based on average ROTCE over the 3-year performance period = Ultimate number of units earned Awards subject to reduction/cancellation/clawback based on risk, control & conduct features (including protection-based vesting) 1Average ROTCE is calculated over the three-year post-grant performance period using unadjusted reported data as set forth in public financial disclosures.

Compensation discussion: PSU performance, holding and recovery conditions · Filed 06/04/2026

All employees are prohibited from hedging or pledging unvested RSUs and PSUs, and unexercised SARs or stock options.

Compensation policies: prohibition on hedging or pledging unvested awards · Filed 06/04/2026

Dimon •Individual OC members and senior leaders have been provided with opportunities to gain exposure to different parts of the business and to deepen their leadership experience in new or expanded roles Our Board provides independent oversight of the Firm’s business and affairs •Oversees the business and affairs of the Firm based on sound governance practices and effective leadership structure •Reviews and approves the Firm’s strategic plan and oversees strategic objectives •Oversees the Firm’s financial performance and condition •Oversees the Firm’s risk management and internal control frameworks •Oversees executive performance, talent management and succession planning •Sets the cultural “tone at the top” We actively engage with shareholders •We engage with shareholders throughout the year on a wide variety of topics, such as strategy, financial and operating performance, competitive environment, regulatory landscape and environmental, social and governance-related matters •In 2025, our stakeholder engagement initiatives included: —Shareholder engagement: We solicited feedback and provided updates on topics of interest through engagements with approximately 338 shareholders and other stakeholders that represented approximately 37% of the Firm's outstanding common stock —Senior management engagement: Senior management presented at approximately 17 investor conferences and events and held approximately 61 meetings to connect shareholders with the Firm's senior leaders Our governance practices promote Board effectiveness and shareholder interests •Annual Board and committee assessment •Robust shareholder rights: —Proxy access —Right to call a special meeting —Right to act by written consent •Majority voting for all director elections •Stock ownership requirements for directors •100% principal standing committee independence •Executive sessions of independent directors at each regular Board meeting 2026 Proxy Statement 3 Table of Contents 2026 Proxy summary PROPOSAL 1: Election of directors page 7 The Board of Directors has nominated the 11 individuals listed below.

Proxy summary: shareholder rights and independent committee practices · Filed 06/04/2026

2026 Proxy Statement 23 Table of Contents Corporate governance | Director nominees Director nominees Board governance Board oversight Engagement Key oversight responsibilities of the principal standing committees of the Board Board of directors Audit Oversees: 15 meetings in 2025 •The independent registered public accounting firm’s qualifications and independence •The performance of the internal audit function and the independent public accounting firm •Management’s responsibilities to ensure that there is an effective system of controls reasonably designed to: —Safeguard the assets and income of the Firm —Ensure integrity of financial statements —Maintain compliance with the Firm’s ethical standards, policies, plans and procedures, and with laws and regulations •Internal control framework •Reputational risks and conduct risks within its scope of responsibility CMDC Oversees: 6 meetings in 2025 •Development of and succession for key executives •Compensation principles and practices •Compensation and qualified benefit programs •Operating Committee performance assessments and compensation •Culture and significant employee conduct issues and any related actions •Reputational risks and conduct risks within its scope of responsibility Governance Oversees: 7 meetings in 2025 •Review of the qualifications of proposed nominees for Board membership •Corporate governance practices applicable to the Firm •The framework for the Board’s self-assessment •Shareholder engagement •Board and committee composition •Reputational risks and conduct risks within its scope of responsibility Risk Oversees: 7 meetings in 2025 •Management’s responsibility to implement an effective global risk management framework reasonably designed to identify, assess and manage the Firm’s risks, including: —Strategic risk —Market risk —Credit and investment risk —Operational risk •Applicable primary risk management policies •Risk appetite results and breaches •The Firm’s capital and liquidity planning and analysis •Reputational risks and conduct risks within its scope of responsibility PRC Oversees: 4 meetings in 2025 •Community investing and fair lending practices •Significant policies and practices regarding political contributions, major lobbying priorities and principal trade association memberships related to Firm public policy objectives •Sustainability •Consumer practices, including consumer experience, consumer complaint resolution and consumer issues related to disclosures, fees or the introduction of major new products •Reputational risks and conduct risks within its scope of responsibility For more information about committee responsibilities, see committee Charters available at: jpmorganchase.com/about/ governance/committees.

Board governance: committee responsibilities and actual 2025 meeting counts · Filed 06/04/2026

Leadership and Board Culture We are especially fortunate to have Jamie Dimon continue to lead JPMorganChase as Chairman and CEO.

Lead Independent Director letter: combined Chairman and CEO roles · Filed 06/04/2026

Net charge-offs were $2.2 billion, up $70 million, predominantly driven by Card Services, reflecting loan growth.

CCB credit results: actual charge-offs and loan-growth explanation · Filed 06/08/2026

•$292 million in wholesale, largely driven by changes in the credit quality of certain exposures, and

Balance-sheet analysis: wholesale allowance addition linked to credit-quality changes · Filed 01/05/2026

Actual deposit rates paid may differ from the modeled assumptions, primarily due to customer behavior and competition for deposits.

Interest-rate risk: deposit pricing and customer-behavior uncertainty · Filed 06/08/2026

As of June 30, 2026, the Advanced Total Capital ratio became the most binding constraint for the Firm’s Basel III risk-based ratios.

Capital risk management: binding Advanced Total Capital constraint · Filed 06/08/2026

December 31, (in billions) January 1, 2026 2025 2024 Consumer & Community Banking $ 61.5 $ 56.0 $ 54.5 Commercial & Investment Bank 166.5 149.5 132.0 Asset & Wealth Management 16.0 16.0 15.5 Corporate 98.4 120.9 122.7 Total common stockholders’ equity $ 342.4 $ 342.4 $ 324.7 96 JPMorgan Chase & Co./2025 Form 10-K Capital actions Common stock dividends The Firm’s common stock dividends are planned as part of the Capital Management governance framework in line with the Firm’s capital management objectives.

Capital allocation: common stockholders' equity and dividend governance · Filed 13/02/2026

The Firm increased its quarterly common dividend from $1.25 to $1.50 per share.

2025 performance summary: actual quarterly dividend increase · Filed 06/04/2026

common stock held by non-affiliates as of June 30, 2025: $794,433,813,496 Number of shares of common stock outstanding as of January 31, 2026: 2,697,032,375 Documents incorporated by reference: Portions of the registrant’s Proxy Statement for the annual meeting of stockholders to be held on May 19, 2026, are incorporated by reference in this Form 10-K in response to Items 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Part III.

Cover page: January 2026 common shares outstanding · Filed 13/02/2026

Number of shares of common stock outstanding as of January 31, 2025: 2,796,106,099

Cover page: January 2025 common shares outstanding · Filed 14/02/2025

Noninterest expense was $11.1 billion, up 13%, reflecting: •higher noncompensation expense, predominantly driven by continued investments in marketing and technology, and higher auto lease depreciation on higher auto operating lease assets, as well as •higher compensation expense, predominantly for advisors and bankers, including higher revenue-related compensation.

CCB expenses: actual technology, marketing and staffing investment · Filed 06/08/2026

As a result of the agreement, the Firm made a payment of $609 million to the FDIC on January 31, 2025 and reduced its additional payable to the FDIC, which resulted in a gain of $588 million recorded in other income in the first quarter of 2025.

First Republic acquisition: FDIC payment and settlement gain · Filed 01/05/2026

In addition, as of June 30, 2025, all outstanding matters between the Firm and the FDIC related to the final settlement of the purchase price for the First Republic acquisition had been resolved.

First Republic acquisition: purchase-price settlement completed · Filed 01/05/2026

The Firm delivered managed revenue2 of $185.6 billion, which was a record for the eighth-consecutive year, and net income of $57.0 billion, or $20.02 per share, with ROTCE2 of 20%.

2025 performance summary: eight consecutive record managed-revenue years · Filed 06/04/2026

•higher NII in Banking & Wealth Management (“BWM”), driven by higher deposit margin, reflecting the impact of changes in FTP, partially offset by lower average deposit balances.

2025 CCB results: deposit margin affected by funds transfer pricing and lower average deposits · Filed 13/02/2026

Publication history

Publication history
VersionUpdatedCompetitive advantage
418/10/2026narrow
318/10/2026narrow
218/10/2026narrow
118/10/2026Unavailable

Sources

Research methodology and limitations · What is an economic moat?