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Brookfield

NYSE: BN · USD

Brookfield (BN) Economic Moat Analysis63

Competitive advantages, dated evidence and erosion risks.

Narrow economic moat

Brookfield has a narrow moat supported by demonstrated fundraising, long-duration fee relationships and contractual rights in selected operating businesses. Infrastructure inflation indexation has produced realized pricing protection, but negotiated fees, regulated tariffs and market-priced power limit broader pricing power. The evidence does not establish a group-wide cost advantage, network effect or exceptional durability.

Intangible assets

Brookfield's investment franchise supports repeated fundraising across fund vintages and strategies. Actual capital raised supports a current franchise advantage, although management's claims of superior operating expertise are not independently established.

Durability
Fundraising achievements across multiple years support persistence, while long-term fee relationships provide time to maintain investor relationships. Future fundraising remains performance-dependent.
Competitors
Comparison not established
Erosion risks
Poor investment performance, reputational damage and unresolved conflicts could reduce new commitments and increase fee pressure. Fundraising includes affiliated wealth-solutions mandates.
What would invalidate the thesis
Repeated failure to raise successor funds, sustained contraction in external commitments, or material fee concessions alongside weaker fundraising would undermine the franchise assessment.
Evidence (3) · Counterevidence (2)

Switching costs

Capital typically committed for ten years and substantial perpetual strategies create contractual persistence in Brookfield's management relationships. This supports revenue continuity without establishing that investors must select Brookfield for their next allocation.

Durability
Existing commitments typically span ten years with extension options; perpetual strategies provide additional duration. Termination rights and investor redemption provisions are not supplied.
Competitors
Comparison not established
Erosion risks
Investors can choose different managers for future commitments, seek lower fees or withdraw where permitted. Fees tied to capitalization or NAV can decline without a contractual fee-rate reduction.
What would invalidate the thesis
Material early terminations, widespread renegotiation of existing fees, or sustained contraction in perpetual fee-bearing capital would weaken the claimed contractual persistence.
Evidence (4) · Counterevidence (2)

Intangible assets

Selected operating businesses hold long-duration concessions and tariff rights that protect access to customer cash flows. Inflation-adjusted water concessions and realized infrastructure indexation support a localized advantage, rather than a moat across every portfolio business.

Durability
Brazilian water and wastewater concessions had an average remaining duration of 23 years at December 31, 2025. Earlier disclosures also establish transmission tariff rights and long-term midstream contracts.
Competitors
Comparison not established
Erosion risks
Regulators can constrain allowed tariffs and returns. Financing costs, operating costs and counterparty performance can offset contractual protection; market-priced activities remain exposed.
What would invalidate the thesis
Concession cancellation or adverse renegotiation, regulatory decisions preventing cost recovery, or persistent failure of indexation to protect operating cash generation would undermine this advantage.
Evidence (4) · Counterevidence (3)

Changes since the previous analysis

  • Retain the previous narrow-moat verdict; the supplied contractual disclosures and operating achievements support it.
  • Make concession rights explicit and distinguish contractual pricing protection from discretionary fee or tariff increases.
  • Add criterion-level assessments and realized contrary evidence from energy trading and private equity; these do not establish group-wide competitive weakness.

Evidence limitations

  • No supplied passage identifies a named competing company in a competitive role. Companies mentioned as investments, affiliates or directors' employers are not treated as competitors.
  • Fundraising and operating results are issuer-reported achievements. Claims of superior expertise, high barriers and long-term shareholder returns do not independently establish exceptional durability.
  • Fundraising includes wealth-solutions mandates, and substantial management revenue is intercompany; neither is equivalent to independent external customer preference.
  • No comparable fee-rate series, customer cohort retention, comprehensive contract termination provisions or group-wide price/cost bridge is supplied.
  • Compensation passages establish historical share-linked instruments and settlement, but not current executive ownership, vesting requirements or comprehensive incentive alignment.
  • All source dates have dateKind filed. Later transaction expectations are assessed as expectations at those filing dates, not as subsequently completed events.
  • The previous accepted analysis supplies only a verdict and summary, limiting detailed version comparison.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis

Calculated from annual filings. Missing data remains unavailable. Detailed financial charts remain in the other topics.

Financial indicators to test against the thesis
PeriodGross marginOperating marginROICFCF margin
202141.7%———
202241.7%———
202345.6%———
202453.3%———
202562.2%———

Pricing power50

  • Pricing outcomes

    Infrastructure indexation contributed to realized growth. Power selling prices rose from $65/MWh in 2024 to $83/MWh in 2025, but earlier losses and market exposure show mixed pricing control. Fee-bearing capital growth does not establish higher fee rates.

  • Customer demand

    Long commitments, growing perpetual fee-bearing capital and software obligations support strong relationship persistence. Repeat demand is assessed indirectly from fundraising across successive vintages and years; no customer retention rate is inferred, and affiliated capital contributes.

  • Margin resilience

    Infrastructure operating FFO grew in 2024 excluding disposition gains and improved again in 2025, with indexation contributing. Interest and other offsets, plus realized energy losses, show uneven resilience. These cash-flow results are indirect evidence; a consolidated margin bridge is absent.

  • Pricing freedom

    Management fees follow capital-based formulas, concessions face regulated rates, and power is sold at contractual or prevailing market prices. These arrangements provide predictability but demonstrate limited unilateral repricing freedom; investors may seek lower fees.

Management—

  • Capital discipline

    Actual repurchases, disclosed corporate liquidity and limited corporate recourse demonstrate active capital management. The undrawn $2 billion BWS commitment remains a real obligation, and financing costs offset operating gains. The evidence supports mixed discipline without establishing buyback value or superior acquisition returns.

  • Incentive alignment

    Historical DSU valuation links an instrument to the share price, while the RSU plan was terminated and settled in 2024. Current executive holdings, award sizes, vesting and performance conditions are insufficiently disclosed to assess management alignment.

  • Execution

    Completed fundraising across fund vintages and infrastructure growth from indexation, volumes and commissioned projects demonstrate execution. Attribution is partly indirect operating evidence; the private equity FFO decline includes dispositions, fees and ownership changes, limiting any claim of uniformly strong results.

  • Governance

    An independent audit committee and an unqualified auditor opinion on internal controls support functioning oversight. Less protective private-issuance approval thresholds temper the assessment; effective financial controls alone do not establish exceptional shareholder governance.

Sources and methodology

Current publication · Updated 18/10/2026 · Version 4

AI interpretation based on checked source excerpts. Issuer assertions and evidence limitations remain explicit.

Policy quality-scores-2: six equally weighted categories. The overall score requires full coverage. Missing inputs are not zero. Qualitative grades are sourced interpretations, not probabilities. 2/6 · 18/10/2026

Moat63

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

structural advantage · 3/4 · Ten-year capital commitments, perpetual fee relationships and long-duration concessions establish meaningful structural protection. Repeated fundraising supports the franchise; comparative cost leadership and network effects are unproven.

durability · 3/4 · Disclosed commitment periods and 23-year average remaining water concessions support strong duration. Perpetual fee-bearing capital increased from $208.6 billion in 2024 to $241 billion in 2025, but future allocations and regulatory terms remain contestable.

customer dependency · 2/4 · Existing capital commitments and software obligations support persistent relationships. They do not demonstrate that investors depend on Brookfield for future allocations or establish portfolio-wide switching difficulty.

erosion resilience · 2/4 · Infrastructure indexation supported operating growth in successive years, while realized power losses demonstrate incomplete protection. Reputation, investor fee negotiations and regulated returns remain erosion channels rather than demonstrated current failures.

Pricing power50

Equal-weight average of four evidence-backed rubric grades (0–4), scaled to 100.

realized pricing · 2/4 · Infrastructure indexation contributed to realized growth. Power selling prices rose from $65/MWh in 2024 to $83/MWh in 2025, but earlier losses and market exposure show mixed pricing control. Fee-bearing capital growth does not establish higher fee rates.

retention · 3/4 · Long commitments, growing perpetual fee-bearing capital and software obligations support strong relationship persistence. Repeat demand is assessed indirectly from fundraising across successive vintages and years; no customer retention rate is inferred, and affiliated capital contributes.

margin resilience · 2/4 · Infrastructure operating FFO grew in 2024 excluding disposition gains and improved again in 2025, with indexation contributing. Interest and other offsets, plus realized energy losses, show uneven resilience. These cash-flow results are indirect evidence; a consolidated margin bridge is absent.

contractual freedom · 1/4 · Management fees follow capital-based formulas, concessions face regulated rates, and power is sold at contractual or prevailing market prices. These arrangements provide predictability but demonstrate limited unilateral repricing freedom; investors may seek lower fees.

Predictability—

Missing exact annual revenue, free cash flow or FCF margin; operating cash flow and capex must both be reported for all five years.

Financial strength—

Missing required inputs: debtFcfGrade, interestCoverageGrade, currentRatioGrade. Equal-weight grades: debt/FCF (1–8x), net debt/earnings before interest and tax (0–5x), interest service (1–12x), current ratio (0.75–2x). Earnings use reported operating income, or reported pretax profit plus reported interest expense when operating income is unavailable. Interest service uses earnings/interest expense; if unavailable, it uses reported operating cash flow/cash interest paid, without relabeling cash paid as accrued expense. Nonpositive cash flow/earnings score 0 for their service component; reported zero interest with a positive numerator scores 100. Net cash scores 100 for net leverage. Missing disclosures remain unavailable. General nonfinancial-company rubric, not a credit rating; exceptional and nonoperating gains are not normalized out. IFRS finance-cost and cash-flow classifications retain their reported scope.

netDebtEbitGrade
100.00

Capital allocation—

Missing required inputs: operatingReturn, sbcRevenue, cashConversionGrade. Three-year equal-weight indicators: pretax return on average invested capital (0–25%; equity + debt − cash, each year and its prior year), share-count growth (0–5%, lower better), share-based cost/revenue (2–20%, lower better), consolidated FCF/net income (0–1x). Return uses reported operating income or, if unavailable, EBIT calculated from reported pretax profit plus reported interest expense; exceptional/nonoperating gains are not normalized out. Share-based cost uses the reported cash-flow add-back or, if absent, separately reported recognized compensation expense; the latter never becomes an FCF adjustment. Nonpositive net income scores 0 for cash conversion; absent income/FCF stays unavailable. Nonpositive invested capital has no defined return and remains unavailable. Does not establish acquisition quality or buyback timing.

3-year average dilution (%)
-1.49

Management—

Insufficient evidence for every rubric criterion; no category score is inferred.

capital discipline · 2/4 · Actual repurchases, disclosed corporate liquidity and limited corporate recourse demonstrate active capital management. The undrawn $2 billion BWS commitment remains a real obligation, and financing costs offset operating gains. The evidence supports mixed discipline without establishing buyback value or superior acquisition returns.

incentive alignment · — · Historical DSU valuation links an instrument to the share price, while the RSU plan was terminated and settled in 2024. Current executive holdings, award sizes, vesting and performance conditions are insufficiently disclosed to assess management alignment.

execution · 3/4 · Completed fundraising across fund vintages and infrastructure growth from indexation, volumes and commissioned projects demonstrate execution. Attribution is partly indirect operating evidence; the private equity FFO decline includes dispositions, fees and ownership changes, limiting any claim of uniformly strong results.

governance · 2/4 · An independent audit committee and an unqualified auditor opinion on internal controls support functioning oversight. Less protective private-issuance approval thresholds temper the assessment; effective financial controls alone do not establish exceptional shareholder governance.

Evidence

Brookfield Corporation - 2025 Annual Information Form 5 2025 Activity Asset Management In 2025, our asset management business benefited from strong fundraising across our flagship and complementary funds, with total fundraising of over $110 billion.

2025 Activity / Asset Management · Filed 18/03/2026

In 2023, our asset management business benefited from strong fundraising across our flagship and complementary fund offerings, with total capital raised of $83 billion.

2023 Activity / Asset Management · Filed 24/03/2025

The successful fundraising across our various flagship series included the final close of our fifth infrastructure flagship fund and our sixth private equity flagship fund, bringing the total capital raised in these strategies to $30 billion and $12 billion, respectively.

2023 Activity / flagship fund closes · Filed 24/03/2025

Our business relationships and reputation could be negatively impacted by a number of factors including poor performance; actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest that are not adequately addressed; misconduct or alleged misconduct by employees; rumors or innuendos; or failed or ineffective implementation of new investments or strategies.

Business Environment and Risks / Reputation · Filed 18/03/2026

Investors may decline to invest in current and future managed entities and may withdraw their investments from managed entities as a result of poor performance in the entity in which they are 108 BROOKFIELD CORPORATION invested, and investors in private funds may demand lower fees for new or existing funds, all of which would decrease our revenue.

Business Environment and Risks / investor withdrawals and fee pressure · Filed 18/03/2026

1.Diversified and long-term base management fees on capital that is typically committed for 10 years with two one-year extension options.

Asset Management / long-term base management fees · Filed 18/03/2026

Perpetual Strategies – $241 billion fee-bearing capital

Asset Management / perpetual strategies fee-bearing capital · Filed 18/03/2026

1.Long-term perpetual base management fees, which are based on total capitalization or net asset value (“NAV”) of our perpetual affiliates and the NAV of its perpetual private funds.

Asset Management / perpetual base management fee terms · Filed 18/03/2026

Perpetual Strategies – $208.6 billion fee-bearing capital

Asset Management / 2024 perpetual strategies fee-bearing capital · Filed 24/03/2025

A significant portion of our asset management revenue is intercompany in nature and thus eliminated on consolidation; that which survives is recorded as revenue in the Consolidated Statements of Operations.

Revenue recognition / intercompany asset management revenue · Filed 18/03/2026

In our Brazilian water and wastewater operation business, our long-term, inflation-adjusted concession service contracts with various municipalities have an average remaining contract duration of 23 years as at December 31, 2025 (2024 – 22 years), and the remaining performance obligations were approximately $8.9 billion (2024 – $8.3 billion).

Revenue / Brazilian water and wastewater concession obligations · Filed 18/03/2026

•Concession arrangements of $3.0 billion (2022 – $2.8 billion) at our Brazilian regulated transmission operation that provide the right to charge a tariff over the terms of the agreements.

Intangible assets / Brazilian transmission concession tariff rights · Filed 19/03/2024

•Customer relationships and shipping agreements of $2.1 billion (2022 – $2.2 billion) at our Canadian diversified midstream operation, relating to long-term take-or-pay and fee-for-service contractual arrangements.

Intangible assets / Canadian midstream contractual arrangements · Filed 19/03/2024

FFO of $757 million increased by $190 million from the prior year, primarily due to inflation indexation on contracts, volume growth in our utilities, midstream and data businesses, and disposition gains from the sale of our Australian container terminal operations, as well as commissioning of capital projects across our businesses.

Infrastructure / 2025 FFO drivers · Filed 18/03/2026

If any of the respective regulators in the jurisdictions in which we operate decides to change the tolls or rates we are allowed to charge, or the amounts of the provisions we are allowed to collect, we may not be able to earn the rate of return on our investments that we had planned, or we may not be able to recover our initial cost.

Infrastructure risks / regulated tolls and rates · Filed 19/03/2024

This was partially offset by net disposition activity, increased interest expense related to additional borrowings to finance ongoing investments, the impact of foreign exchange, and higher management fees from the increased market capitalization at BIP.

Infrastructure / financing and other offsets · Filed 18/03/2026

As a result, we recognized an FFO deficit of $28 million due to higher generation and lower market pricing.

Renewable Power and Transition / 2024 energy contract FFO deficit · Filed 24/03/2025

ii.Energy Contracts During the year, we purchased 2,809 GWh (2024 – 3,442 GWh) from BEP at $72 per MWh (2024 – $74 per MWh) and sold the purchased generation at an average selling price of $83 per MWh (2024 – $65 per MWh).

Renewable Power and Transition / realized power purchase and selling prices · Filed 18/03/2026

Excluding the impact of realized disposition gains, operating FFO increased by $27 million primarily due to organic growth across our businesses from inflation indexation, commissioning of capital projects, rate base increases, and net acquisition activity, partially offset by increased interest expense related to additional borrowings to finance ongoing capital projects, as well as the impact of foreign exchange.

Infrastructure / 2024 operating FFO growth excluding disposition gains · Filed 24/03/2025

Our dealer software and technology services operation had remaining performance obligations related to its long-term software and maintenance and support contracts of approximately $3.3 billion (2024 – $3.0 billion).

Revenue / dealer software contractual performance obligations · Filed 18/03/2026

Fees are typically equal to a percentage of fee-bearing capital within the respective fund or entity and are accrued quarterly.

Revenue recognition / management fee calculation · Filed 18/03/2026

Revenue is recorded based on the output delivered and capacity provided at rates specified under contract terms or at prevailing market rates if the sale is uncontracted.

Revenue recognition / contracted and market power rates · Filed 18/03/2026

Under the bid, which commenced on May 27, 2025 and is set to expire on May 26, 2026, BN has, as of March 10, 2026, purchased 9,294,073 Class A Shares at an average price of $43.07.

Corporate / completed Class A share repurchases · Filed 18/03/2026

As at December 31, 2025, only $14 billion of long-term debt has recourse to the Corporation.

Capitalization / corporate recourse debt · Filed 18/03/2026

We maintain significant liquidity ($5.9 billion in the form of corporate cash and financial assets and undrawn credit facilities) at the corporate level to further enable growth across business cycles.

Liquidity / corporate cash, financial assets and facilities · Filed 18/03/2026

31 (MILLIONS) 2025 2024 Management fees earned $ 350 $ 304 The company provided BWS with an equity commitment in the amount of $2.0 billion to fund future growth, which BWS may draw on from time to time.

Related party transactions / BWS equity commitment · Filed 18/03/2026

As of December 31, 2025, there was no amount drawn under this equity commitment (2024 – $nil).

Related party transactions / undrawn BWS commitment · Filed 18/03/2026

Excluding the impact of realized disposition gains, operating FFO decreased by $366 million compared to the prior year as same-store growth from commercial execution and business optimization initiatives were more than offset by net disposition activity, performance fees incurred in the quarter, and our reduced direct ownership in BBU.

2025 Activity / private equity operating FFO decline and drivers · Filed 18/03/2026

The members of the audit committee are: Satish Rai, Janice Fukakusa and Rafael Miranda, each of whom is “independent” (as such term is defined in the rules of the NYSE).

Audit Committee / current member independence · Filed 18/03/2026

The TSX threshold for shareholder approval of private issuances of common shares is generally 25%, subject to additional shareholder approval requirements in the case of certain issuances to insiders, and accordingly, the registrant will be permitted to rely on shareholder approval rules that may be less favorable to shareholders than for U.S.

Corporate governance / private issuance shareholder approval threshold · Filed 18/03/2026

We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) (PCAOB), the Corporation’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2025, based on criteria established in Internal Control — Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission and our report dated March 17, 2026, expressed an unqualified opinion on the Corporation’s internal control over financial reporting.

Independent auditor report / internal control opinion · Filed 18/03/2026

The fair value of each DSU is equal to the traded price of the company’s common shares.

Share-based compensation / DSU valuation · Filed 24/03/2025

During the year ended December 31, 2024, the RSU plan was terminated and all participants received cash or other financial instruments equivalent to the fair value at the date of settlement.

Share-based compensation / RSU plan termination and settlement · Filed 24/03/2025

We also raised approximately $68 billion of capital this year across more than a dozen credit strategies and under our mandate with Brookfield Wealth Solutions.

2025 Activity / credit strategies and wealth-solutions fundraising · Filed 18/03/2026

Publication history

Publication history
VersionUpdatedCompetitive advantage
418/10/2026narrow
318/10/2026narrow
218/10/2026narrow
118/10/2026Unavailable

Sources

Research methodology and limitations · What is an economic moat?